



Evidence from the Vietnam War era draft shows that when
government policies impact negatively on people, they are
more likely to vote.
When do government policies motivate people to vote? Tiffany Davenport uses the historical
example of military draft policy in the United States to study the conditions under which public
policies motivate political participation.  Using the Vietnam War era draft policy as a case study,
she finds that people who face potential loss as a result of government policies are more likely to
respond; parents whose sons were at greater risk of being drafted voted at higher rates than
parents of sons who were safe from the draft. She also finds that the effect of draft risk on voter
turnout was much stronger among parents in towns that had experienced local casualties from
the War. 
Some public policies have consequences that are substantially more imposing on citizens than others; perhaps
there is no policy that is more potentially harmful than the military draft. Conscription threatens the lives of the
men eligible for service and confronts parents and families of eligible men with the gravest of potential threats: the
loss of a son, a brother, a father, or a husband to involuntary military service.  Until its end in 1973, the military
draft posed a significant imposition and grave threat to a selection of American men and their families, while
others avoided the obligation of service.  In new research I find that the parents of men who were at high risk of
being drafted were more likely to vote, and that this effect was strengthened when their home towns had
experienced casualties in the Vietnam War.
On November 26, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon signed Executive Order 11497 to radically alter the process
through which American men were inducted for military service in the Vietnam War.  As part of a series of reforms
to the military draft administered by the Selective Service System, Nixon established a random lottery for
determining induction priority for young men turning 19 years of age, replacing the oldest-man-first policy of draft
induction order.  In randomizing the order of induction priority, Nixon randomized the risk of military service, and in
doing so, created one of America’s most dramatic and important “natural experiments” of public policy.
On December 1, 1969, in supremely dramatic fashion, the first draft lottery was held.  Millions of young men held
their breath as blue capsules, each containing one possible birth date, were drawn out of a glass urn in front of a
live national television and radio audience.  The order in which a man’s birthday was drawn determined his
Random Sequence Number. In 1969, the first birth date selected was September 14, so young men born on that
day between the years 1944 and 1950 were the first in line to be drafted in the case that they were deemed
eligible and exempt from classifications that would prevent or delay their induction.  Each year, a ceiling was
determined, above which no numbers were called.  For the1969 lottery, the highest Random Sequence Number
called was 195. For men subject to the 1970 lottery, it was 125. From the 1971 lottery, the highest number called
was 95.
While having a low number did not guarantee induction into military service given the fact that men could obtain
deferments, it did significantly increase the risk that a man would serve in the military.  Throughout the draft lottery
era, as troop levels were drawn down and U.S. involvement in Vietnam came to an end, numerous classes of
deferments that enabled some men to avoid service were eliminated.  The end of many deferments and the
random assignment of draft risk were measures put in place by Nixon to confront popular sentiment that Selective
Service procedures were inherently inequitable.
Congressman Alexander Pirnie reaching into a container of draft numbers (center) as others look on, including retiring Selective Service Director Lt.
General Lewis Blaine Hershey (left) and Deputy Director Col. Daniel O. Omer (right) at the Selective Service Headquarters during the nationwide draft
lottery, 1969  MST.
Because the lotteries randomized the risk of induction, they present what social scientists call a “ natural
experiment.”  In the absence of such a research design, it is difficult to measure the effect of policy-induced risk on
responsive forms of participation because the very attributes that correlate with exposure to a policy like the draft
are the same attributes that correlate with voting.  For example, voter turnout and serving in the military as a
result of the draft both systematically vary with education. Higher levels of education are associated with higher
rates of participation in elections and lower likelihood of service during the Vietnam War. Research that failed to
account for such a correlation between military service and attributes that determine political attitudes and
behaviors frequently found no relationship between self-interest defined as having a friend or relative serve in the
Vietnam War and related attitudes and behaviors.
Recent studies that utilize the near-random assignment of draft risk can better isolate the causal effect of policy
exposure on political outcomes.  When the draft lotteries are employed as an external, policy-induced source of
draft risk, the conclusions about the effect of self-interest on political attitudes and partisanship, for example are
different.  Drawing a “losing number” made draft-eligible men more likely to oppose the War, affiliate with the
Democratic Party, and hold liberal political attitudes.
I measure the effect of exposure to policy-induced draft risk on the political behavior of a draft-eligible man’s
parents. I assembled an original data set using information from archived administrative documents including town
annual reports and voter checklists from 167 small towns in New Hampshire. In this “natural experiment” parents
for whom at least one draft-eligible son was assigned a “losing” lottery number were considered to have been
exposed to the “treatment condition” of military draft risk.
I estimated the average effect of a son’s lottery number assigned in 1969, 1970, or 1971 on his parents’ voter
turnout in 1972. Among registered voters, parents of men who were at high risk of being drafted were, on average,
more than four percentage points more likely to vote in the following presidential election. The effects of riskier
draft lottery numbers on parents’ turnout were much stronger in towns from which there had been at least one
casualty in the War prior to the lotteries; in towns with casualties, parents of sons facing high risk of being drafted
voted at rates between seven and nine percentage points higher than parents of sons whose numbers rendered
them safe from the draft.
These findings indicate that policy-induced risk of loss motivates responsive participation. A son’s losing the draft
lottery caused parents to vote at higher rates in 1972; winning it did not. This supports the general finding that
people are more likely to punish public officials for losses than to reward them for gains. Why were the effects so
strong in towns with previous war casualties?  One possibility is that there were lower rates of deferments in these
towns and therefore the actual risk of serving in Vietnam as a consequence of a low lottery number was higher. 
Further analysis does not tend to support this hypothesis. Another hypothesis is that local casualties intensified
the effects of high draft risk on parents’ responsive voting by making examples of the potential harm of draft risk
immediately accessible in their minds and rendering death as a consequence of being drafted a more probable
outcome.
Though the exact manner in which policies exert influence on participation is unclear, the fact that the strength of
the effects of draft risk on parents’ voter turnout differed across towns suggests that individual self-interest and
social and political context interact to determine mass political responses to government policies. When
government policies result in some form of loss or negative imposition on people, they are more likely to vote. 
Where the consequences are clearest and the stakes appear to be the highest, policies will have stronger
mobilizing effects on the public.
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